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Foreword
The AICPA Special Committee on Audit Committees was appointed to
study whether the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
should require that companies establish audit committees of their boards
of directors as a condition of an audit by an independent public accountant
and, if so, to propose a plan for adoption of a requirement. This report
presents the results of our study.
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Report of the Special Committee on
Audit Committees
Background
The AICPA has long advocated the formation of audit committees. In
1967, the AICPA recommended that publicly owned corporations establish
audit committees composed of outside directors. In July 1977, the AICPA
Board of Directors repeated that recommendation and urged Institute
members to encourage corporations to establish audit committees.
Congress has recently expressed interest in audit committees. In
September 1976, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce recom
mended that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgate
rules concerning corporate boards of directors, including a requirement for
audit committees. The report of the Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting
and Management of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs rec
ommended that either the accounting profession or the SEC require pub
licly owned corporations to establish audit committees.
In the past, the SEC has urged the voluntary formation of audit com
mittees. Recently, the chairman of the SEC recommended that the AICPA
consider establishing a requirement for audit committees. The SEC has
also recently adopted requirements for proxy statement disclosure of in
formation about the composition and activities of boards of directors and
their committees, including audit committees.
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has adopted a requirement
that as of June 30, 1978, each domestic company with common stock
listed on the exchange must establish and maintain an audit committee.
Both the SEC and the AICPA have urged other stock exchanges to estab
lish requirements for audit committees. The American Stock Exchange
has established a special advisory committee to study this issue. The
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) is also considering
whether to require audit committees as a condition for a corporation to
have its securities listed on the NASDAQ over-the-counter quotation sys
tem.
Exact figures on the number of publicly owned corporations with audit
committees are not available, but surveys have shown that a large and
increasing percentage of publicly owned corporations have voluntarily
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formed audit committees.1 Of course, each of the more than 1,500 corpo
rations coming under the requirement of the NYSE must now have an
audit committee. Surveys taken before the requirement was established
showed that a large majority of NYSE corporations had already formed
audit committees. The NASD recently surveyed the approximately 2,600
corporations listed on NASDAQ, its over-the-counter securities quotation
system. The survey showed that about 68 percent of those responding
had audit committees.

The Committee’s Study of the Issues
Issues Paper
A requirement for audit committees involves issues of corporate gover
nance and has implications for many parties outside the accounting pro
fession. Therefore, the committee sought comments and views from indi
viduals and organizations with an interest in the issue. To aid those
wishing to comment, we prepared a paper entitled “An AICPA Require
ment for Audit Committees: An Analysis of the Issues.” The issues paper
described the developments leading up to the study and the issues on
which we sought comments. The issues were as follows:2
1. Should audit committees be required as necessary—
a. To assist independent directors in fulfilling their responsibilities?
b. For an auditor to be able to fulfill his responsibilities under generally
accepted auditing standards?
c. To strengthen auditor independence?
2. If audit committees are to be required, should the requirement apply
to—
a. All public entities?
b. All SEC registrants?
c. Certain SEC registrants?

1. For example, a 1970 survey by Mautz and Neumann showed that 32 percent of the
corporations responding had audit committees, while a repeat of the survey in 1976 showed
that 87 percent had audit committees. R. K. Mautz and F. L. Neumann, Corporate Audit
Committees: Policies and Practices (Cleveland: Ernst & Ernst, 1977), pp. 8-11.

2. As a supplemental issue, we were asked to consider whether the independent auditor
should be required to be present and available to answer questions at the annual meeting of
shareholders. Under SEC proxy statement regulations, shareholders are notified beforehand
whether the auditor will be present and available to answer questions at the annual meeting.
Furthermore, respondents to the issues paper indicated that auditors typically do attend the
annual meetings of publicly owned corporations. Therefore, we do not believe action is
needed on this matter.
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3. What should be the requirements for the composition of the audit com
mittee and the qualifications for membership?
a. Should all members of the audit committee be independent of man
agement, or is it sufficient that a majority be independent?
b. Could the full board of directors qualify effectively as an audit com
mittee?
c. How should “independence” of directors be defined?
d. What other qualifications should be required?
4. Should a requirement for audit committees specify duties to be per
formed by the audit committee?
5. If the AICPA should require audit committees, should the requirement
be implemented in the form of—
a. An amendment of the AICPA Code of Professional Ethics rule on
independence?
b. A statement on auditing standards establishing the auditor’s re
sponsibilities under generally accepted auditing standards?
c. A membership requirement of the SEC practice section of the
AICPA Division for CPA Firms?
6. If an audit committee requirement should not be adopted by the AICPA,
should it be implemented in some other manner?
7. Will a requirement for audit committees have an economic or competi
tive impact on public accounting firms?

Over 60,000 copies of the issues paper were distributed. Copies were
sent to the individuals and organizations on the AICPA’s exposure draft
mailing list for auditing standards, to each of the approximately 30,000
members of the National Association of Corporate Directors, to stock ex
changes and other organizations, and to many others who requested
copies. The request for comments and the announcement of the public
hearing were also widely reported in the national and financial press as
well as in many business and accounting journals and newsletters.3
Response to the Issues Paper

We received written comments from over ninety individuals and organiza
tions of which about one-third were public accountants or accounting firms.
The public hearing was held May 31, 1978, in Chicago. All comments
received were considered by the committee. We found the written com
ments and the discussions at the hearing very useful in forming our con
clusions and recommendations.

3. Those reporting the announcement included the Wall Street Journal (April 10, 1978), the
Chicago Sun Times (April 10, 1978), the Daily Variety (April 10, 1978), the Reuters Financial
Report (April 7, 1978), the American Banker (April 13 and 14, 1978), and the Los Angeles
Daily Journal (April 20, 1978).
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We found considerable agreement among the comments we re
ceived. Generally, corporate officers and directors who commented did not
object to the establishment of audit committees. In fact, most approved of
the audit committee requirement of the NYSE. However, the overwhelm
ing majority believed that an audit committee requirement by the AICPA is
not necessary and questioned whether the AICPA has authority to set
such a requirement. Respondents generally did not view AICPA involve
ment in matters of corporate governance as legitimate or appropriate.
Many respondents, including larger corporations that already have audit
committees, stated that the costs of complying with an audit committee
requirement would be a burden to smaller corporations.
The responses from accountants also showed support for the concept
of audit committees. However, the responses from local firms and several
regional and national firms showed a widespread concern that a broad
requirement for audit committees would have unfortunate competitive ef
fects on smaller firms in the accounting profession without corresponding
improvements in audit practice.
Many of the comments we received from corporate directors and
officers stated that their corporations have audit committees and that the
audit committees are performing effectively. Many independent auditors
and others also expressed satisfaction with audit committees. The large
percentage of publicly owned corporations with audit committees is evi
dence that voluntary efforts to foster audit committees have been effective.
The apparent widespread satisfaction with the performance of audit com
mittees will encourage many more corporations to voluntarily form audit
committees.

Conclusions
Summary
Unlike other professional standards on auditing adopted by the public
accounting profession, a requirement for audit committees would impose
restrictions directly on corporations rather than impose a requirement on
members of the profession. For the AICPA to be able to impose such a
requirement, it must be demonstrated that audit committees are necessary
either for the maintenance of auditor independence or for the performance
of audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.
The special committee is convinced that audit committees can be
helpful to both corporate directors and independent auditors in fulfilling
their respective responsibilities, and the responses we have received from
directors and auditors are evidence that many audit committees are func
tioning effectively. However, based on our study and consideration of the
issues, we cannot conclude that audit committees are necessary either for
4

the maintenance of auditor independence or for performance of an audit in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.
The AICPA has long supported the concept of audit committees, and
we believe that it should continue to support reasonable efforts by stock
exchanges, the NASD, or other appropriate bodies to encourage or re
quire audit committees. We do not believe, however, that there is a
reasonable basis for the AICPA to establish a requirement for audit com
mittees.
The overwhelming view of respondents was that the involvement of
the AICPA in issues of corporate governance is unnecessary and inap
propriate. We are aware that, because of this opposition, it is likely that the
imposition of an audit committee requirement by the AICPA and the im
plementation of such a requirement by AICPA members would face legal
challenge. We have been advised by the AICPA’s counsel that the imposi
tion of an audit committee requirement in the absence of a reasonable
foundation would expose the AICPA and its members to a risk that estab
lished antitrust principles would be violated. We do not believe it would be
possible for the AICPA to sustain the considerable burden of identifying
the necessity of an audit committee requirement.

Possible Bases for a Requirement

The issues paper discussed the possible bases for the establishment of an
audit committee requirement by the AICPA. An audit committee require
ment may be necessary to strengthen auditor independence, or it may be
necessary to permit the auditor to fulfill his responsibilities under generally
accepted auditing standards.
Auditor Independence. The traditional, underlying concept of rules on
independence has been to prohibit relationships with clients that may
conflict, or appear to conflict, with the auditor’s duties. An audit committee
requirement does not fit this concept.
Many advocates of audit committees have noted that the existence of
an audit committee can have a beneficial effect on the auditor’s relation
ship with the client. As the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities
stated, “Although other measures may be needed, active outside directors
can go a long way toward balancing the auditor’s relationship with man
agement.’’4 This commission advocated increased participation by outside
directors, but it did not indicate that an audit committee is essential to
achieve that participation. We agree that audit committees can assist the
auditor, but we are convinced that a requirement for audit committees is
not necessary for auditor independence.

4. Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations
(New York: AICPA, 1978), p. 12.
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An audit committee facilitates the auditor’s communication with the
board of directors when there are disagreements with management, but
the independence of the auditor in a particular engagement depends on
the individual auditor. We do not believe that the public now considers an
auditor’s independence to be impaired because a client does not have an
audit committee. Experience has shown that auditors have been able to
maintain independence and fulfill their responsibilities without the pres
ence of an audit committee.
As discussed elsewhere in this report, a requirement for audit commit
tees could not reasonably apply to all audit clients. Therefore, a require
ment based on auditor independence could not be applied uniformly to all
audit practice. We believe the position that an audit committee is neces
sary for auditor independence for some clients, but not for others, cannot
be justified logically or empirically.

Generally Accepted Auditing Standards. The issues paper asked whether
an audit committee requirement is necessary for the auditor to be able to
fulfill his responsibilities under generally accepted auditing standards. The
respondents believed that an audit committee requirement is not neces
sary for the auditor to fulfill those responsibilities. We have reached the
same conclusion.
Statements on auditing standards now require the auditor to com
municate several matters to the client’s board of directors or its audit
committee. Those matters include illegal acts by management, material
errors and irregularities detected by the audit, and material weaknesses in
internal accounting control. The existence of an audit committee of inde
pendent directors can make it easier for the auditor to report those matters
to the directors, but an audit committee is not necessary for this communi
cation. Auditors are able to bring important matters to the attention of
boards of directors that do not have audit committees.
In the past, statements on auditing standards have been adopted that
raised requirements, although the new requirements may not previously
have been considered necessary for the performance of an audit. State
ments on auditing standards have not, however, imposed requirements
concerning the corporate governance of audit clients. A statement on
auditing standards that would impose such a requirement could, in our
opinion, only be justified if it could be demonstrated that it is necessary to
the performance of an audit in accordance with generally accepted audit
ing standards. Otherwise, companies may be denied audits even though
their financial statements are susceptible to being audited.
We are aware of unusual situations in which independent auditors
have asked specific clients to establish audit committees as a condition for
accepting or continuing an audit engagement. Those decisions have not
involved a concern for the auditor’s independence or compliance with
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generally accepted auditing standards, but have involved the auditor’s
judgment of the business risks associated with the circumstances of a
particular engagement. We considered whether a statement on auditing
standards should be issued to provide guidance to auditors on the cir
cumstances in which an audit committee would be necessary. We con
cluded that it would not be possible to describe those circumstances in a
statement on auditing standards for general applicability so that an auditor
could appropriately be called on to justify a departure from the guidance.

A Membership Requirement of the SEC Practice Section. Besides estab
lishing an audit committee requirement as an independence rule or in a
statement on auditing standards, the issues paper discussed the possibil
ity of having a requirement in the form of a membership requirement of the
SEC practice section of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms. An audit com
mittee requirement in the form of an SEC practice section membership
requirement involves considerations similar to those for an independence
rule or a statement on auditing standards. We do not believe there is a
reasonable basis for imposing such a requirement solely on clients of
members of the SEC practice section.

Corporate Governance

The large number of companies that have voluntarily formed audit commit
tees and the comments we received about the operations of many audit
committees are evidence that many boards of directors find audit commit
tees to be useful.
The overwhelming majority of respondents, however, stated that an
AICPA requirement for audit committees would be an inappropriate inter
ference in corporate governance by the accounting profession. The com
ments of the Financial Executives Institute are representative:
FEI does not agree that the public accounting profession is responsible for
either the organization or conduct of corporate affairs. We believe, therefore,
that the AICPA would overstep its bounds in attempting to establish an audit
committee requirement. The promulgation of such a rule involves more than
simply assuring that enterprises being audited have audit committees. This
rule would impose a structured change on the boards of directors of corpora
tions. We believe there are serious questions as to whether or not the ac
counting profession has the authority to set regulations regarding the estab
lishment and operations of corporate boards.

In their comments, the members of the American Bar Association
Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting stated that audit commit
tees are only a part of a much larger issue:
In our view, the "audit committee issue” is, in reality, a manifestation of
concern with the adequacy of the discharge of their duties by directors of
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publicly held corporations. This concern is being addressed, in particular, to
the duties and responsibilities of the nonmanagement directors, and atten
tion has become recently focused upon the corporate audit committee. When
considered in light of this expanded frame of reference, the mandating of
audit committees merely begins the debate.

In deciding to accept or to continue an engagement, the auditor is
concerned with the management of the client and its possible effect on his
ability to perform the audit. The auditor is properly concerned with his
relationship with the client’s management and directors, but he can re
solve his concern by his decision to accept or reject a client. The structure
of a particular company is a matter to be decided by the owners or their
representatives in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.
Other bodies, including stock exchanges and the NASD, are consider
ing requirements for audit committees. The relationships of those bodies
to publicly owned corporations are quite different from that of the AICPA,
and we believe they may be appropriate authorities for establishing re
quirements for audit committees. We recommend that the Institute support
reasonable proposals by those bodies to encourage or require audit com
mittees for publicly owned corporations. However, in developing any re
quirement for audit committees, consideration should be given to the addi
tional costs involved.

Directors Independent of Management

Since it is generally agreed that an audit committee should have members
independent of management, a requirement for audit committees is, in
effect, a requirement for independent directors.
A majority of the respondents commenting on the issue believe that all
members of an audit committee should be directors who are independent
of management. We believe it is preferable that all members of the audit
committee, but in any case at least a majority of the audit committee,
should be independent of management. In its requirement for audit com
mittees, the NYSE provided guidance about the independence of direc
tors. A number of respondents believed that the Exchange's guidance is
reasonable, and we see no reason to propose different guidance at this
time.

The Duties of Audit Committees
The majority of those commenting on this subject stated that the specific
duties of an audit committee should not be mandated but should be de
termined by individual boards of directors. Some respondents, however,
believed that guidance on the duties of audit committees would be helpful.
The operations of an audit committee should be flexible enough to
meet the needs of the directors, the investors, the auditor, and the com
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pany. The responsibilities and authority of the audit committee are derived
from those of the board of directors, and the specific duties of the audit
committee will depend on the bylaws of the company and the operating
policies and structure of the board of directors.
To assist boards of directors that have established audit committees,
or that are considering establishing audit committees, we offer the follow
ing list of general duties:
1. Approve the selection of the independent auditor.
2. Review the arrangements and scope of the audit.

3. Consider the comments from the independent auditor with respect to
weaknesses in internal accounting control and the consideration given
or corrective action taken by management.
4. Discuss matters of concern to the audit committee, the auditor, or
management relating to the company’s financial statements or other
results of the audit.
5. Review internal accounting procedures and controls with the com
pany’s financial and accounting staff.
6. Review the activities and recommendations of the company’s internal
auditors.
It may also be appropriate for the audit committee to perform addi
tional duties as assigned by the board of directors. Such duties might
include review of financial statements and other financial information dis
tributed by the company to the public, review of changes in accounting
principles or methods of applying them, review of nonaudit services per
formed for the company by the independent auditor, establishment and
monitoring of policies to prohibit unethical, questionable, or illegal activities
by company employees, or review of executive perquisites.
Whether the audit committee should be assigned any of these addi
tional duties will depend on the policies and organization of the board of
directors. For example, the board of directors may prefer to assign the
duties to other committees, such as a compensation committee or an
ethics committee.

Applicability of a Requirement
For companies that already have independent directors, the formation of
audit committees imposes no great additional financial burden, and most
of those companies have already formed audit committees. However, a
number of respondents stated that for many smaller corporations, includ
ing many SEC registrants, a requirement for outside directors would im
pose a significant expense.
Although many studies have examined the structures of corporations,
those studies have concentrated primarily on the larger corporations. Very
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little information is available about the many smaller, publicly owned cor
porations. As one author notes, “Analysis of corporations has been greatly
distorted by assuming that all or most corporations are miniature copies of
AT&T and GM.”5
There are thought to be about 11,000 “publicly owned corporations”
coming under the reporting provisions of the securities acts. Generally,
those are corporations with more than $1 million in assets and 300
shareholders. Of those, only about 3,400 have securities listed on a stock
exchange, and about 2,600 have securities listed on the NASDAQ overthe-counter system. It appears, therefore, that there are about 5,000 pub
licly owned corporations whose securities are not actively traded. Although
no exact figures are available, some idea of the characteristics of publicly
owned corporations is provided by a study that estimated that roughly
3,200 corporations in the United States have more than 1,000 sharehold
ers.6 This indicates that a large proportion of publicly owned corporations
have a relatively insignificant effect on the public securities markets. For
many of those corporations, the cost of an audit committee requirement
would impose an unreasonable burden.
Competitive Effects
A significant number of respondents, in particular, medium and smaller
sized public accounting firms, stated that a requirement for audit commit
tees would be anticompetitive. In general, two reasons were given for the
anticompetitive effect:
1. Newly appointed, independent directors may tend to give little regard to
the past service of the smaller firm.
2. Independent directors may favor the selection of larger, well-known
firms in the belief that it will prevent criticism of the selection by other
outside parties.
For several reasons, the extent of this problem cannot be determined.
Several studies of the causes of auditor changes have been undertaken,
but, of course, the studies do not reveal how the personal attitudes of
directors affect selection of auditors.7 Furthermore, the problem of dis
placement of smaller firms existed before audit committees became popu
lar. It is not possible to tell whether audit committees have added to the
problem or whether the present problems are a continuation of an existing

5. Alfred F. Conrad, “The Corporate Census: A Preliminary Exploration,” California Law
Review 63 (March 1975): 441.
6. Conrad, “The Corporate Census," p. 458.
7. For example, James P. Bedingfield and Stephen E. Loeb, "Auditor Changes: An Examina
tion," Journal of Accountancy, March 1974, pp. 66-68.
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tendency. Despite the lack of empirical evidence, the significant number of
firms commenting on this issue and the fact that many of those respon
dents cited their experience as the basis for their claims, leads us to
believe that the role of audit committees in displacement of smaller firms
should be of concern. We note that the executive committee of the SEC
practice section of the division for CPA firms has established a subcom
mittee to study the relations between auditors and audit committees. The
board of directors of the AICPA adopted the following policy on the issue:
As early as 1967 the Board of Directors of the AICPA expressed its support of
the establishment of audit committees by boards of directors of publicly
traded companies. On July 21, 1977, the Board also endorsed the concept
that boards of directors of such companies or their audit committees should
evaluate, select, and appoint the independent auditors. In carrying out this
function, it should be recognized that all CPA firms whose partners are mem
bers of the AICPA are subject to the same stringent rules of conduct with
respect to maintaining their independence and must comply with quality con
trol requirements described in Statement on Auditing Standards No. 4. In
addition, many firms participate in quality control reviews, either voluntarily or
as members of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms, to enhance the quality of
their auditing services. Thus, the capability of auditing publicly held com
panies is shared by a large number of CPA firms and size alone should not be
the determinative factor in selecting and appointing independent auditors.

The displacement of smaller firms is a problem, but we do not believe
that it is the inescapable result of audit committees. From the comments
we received, it appears that the problem lies not in the concept of audit
committees but, to a large extent, in the attitudes of independent directors
and others. Efforts should be made to change those attitudes, but as long
as those attitudes exist, consideration must be given to the competitive
effects before imposing audit committees on smaller corporations.
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